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Abstract
We initiate the work on fair and strategyproof allo-
cation of indivisible chores. The fairness concept
we consider in this paper is maxmin share (MMS)
fairness. We consider three previously studied
models of information elicited from the agents: the
ordinal model, the cardinal model, and the public
ranking model in which the ordinal preferences are
publicly known. We present both positive and neg-
ative results on the level of MMS approximation
that can be guaranteed if we require the algorithm
to be strategyproof. Our results uncover some inter-
esting contrasts between the approximation ratios
achieved for chores versus goods.
1 Introduction
Multi-agent resource allocation is one of the major research
topics in artificial intelligence [Bouveret et al., 2016]. We
consider fair allocation algorithms of indivisible chores when
agents have additive utilities. The fairness concept we use
in this paper is the intensively studied and well-established
maxmin share fairness. The maxmin fair share of an agent is
the best she can guarantee for herself if she is allowed to par-
tition the items but then receives the least preferred bundle.
In this paper we take a mechanism design perspective to
the problem of fair allocation. We impose the constraint that
the algorithm should be strategyproof, i.e., no agent should
have an incentive for report untruthfully for profile of val-
uations. The research question we explore is the following
one. When allocating indivisible chores, what approximation
guarantee of maxmin share fairness can be achieved by strat-
egyproof algorithms? This approach falls under the umbrella
of approximation mechanism design without money that has
been popularized by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2013].
Maxmin share fairness was proposed by Budish [2011]
as a fairness concept for allocation of indivisible items.
The concept coincides with the standard proportionality
fairness concept if the items to be allocated are divisi-
ble. There have been several works on algorithms that
find an approximate MMS allocation [Procaccia and Wang,
∗The authors are ordered alphabetically. This work is partially
supported by NSF CAREER Award No. 1553385.
2014; Amanatidis et al., 2015; Barman and Murthy, 2017;
Ghodsi et al., 2018; Aziz et al., 2017]. None of these works
took a mechanism design perspective to the problem of com-
puting approximately MMS allocation. Amanatidis et al.
[2016] were the first to embark on a study of strategyproof
and approximately MMS fair algorithms. Their work only
focussed on the case of goods. There are many settings in
which agents may have negative utilities such as when chores
or tasks are allocated. In this paper, we revisit strategyproof
fair allocation by considering the case of chores.
1.1 Our results
We initiate the study of maxmin share (MMS) allocations of
m indivisible chores among n strategic agents. It is assumed
that all agents have underlying cardinal additive utilities over
the chores. We consider three preferencemodels in this work.
• Cardinal model: agents are asked to report their cardi-
nal utilities over the items.
• Ordinal model: agents are only allowed or asked to ex-
press their ordinal rankings over the items.
• Public ranking model: all agents’ rankings are public
information and the agents are asked to report their util-
ities that are consistent the known ordinal rankings.
First, for cardinal and ordinal models, we design a de-
terministic sequential picking algorithm SequPick, which is
strategyproof and unexpectedly achieves an approximation of
O(log m
n
)1. Roughly speaking, given an order of the agents,
a sequential picking algorithm lets each agent i pick ai items
and leave. Amanatidis et al. [2016] proved that when the
items are goods, the best a sequential picking algorithm can
guarantee is an approximation of ⌊(m− n+ 2)/2⌋, and such
an approximation can be easily achieved by letting each of the
first n−1 agents select one item and allocating all the remain-
ing items to the last agent. Compared to their result, we show
that by carefully selecting the ai’s, when items are chores, we
are able to significantly improve the bound to O(log m
n
).
Next, we further improve the approximation ratio for car-
dinal and ordinal models by randomized algorithms. Partic-
ularly, we show that by randomly allocating each item but
allowing each agent to recognize a set of “bad” items and to
1In this paper we use log() to denote log2().
Goods Chores
Lower Upper Lower Upper
Ordinal Ω(logn) O(m− n)
4
3 (D)
6
5 (R)
O(log m
n
) (D)
O(
√
log n) (R)
Cardinal 2 O(m− n)
4
3 (D)
N/A (R)
O(log m
n
) (D)
O(
√
log n) (R)
Public ranking 65
3
2 for n = 2
2 for n = 3
O(n) for any n
6
5 (D)
3
2 for n ≤ 3
2 for any n
Table 1: Lower and upper bounds on approximation of MMS fairness of strategyproof algorithms. The results for goods were proved
by Amanatidis et al. [2016], all of which concern deterministic algorithms. The results for chores are proved in this paper, where we use (D)
and (R) to indicate deterministic and randomized algorithms, respectively.
be able to decline each allocated “bad” item once, the result-
ing algorithm is strategyproof and achieves an approximation
ratio of O(
√
logn) in expectation.
We complement these upper bound results with lower
bound results by showing that for cardinal and ordinal model,
no deterministic strategyproof algorithm has a better than 43
approximation. For the ordinal model, we prove that the
lower bound of 43 cannot be improved by non-strategyproof
algorithms. For randomized non-strategyproof algorithms,
this bound cannot be improved to be better than 65 .
Finally, for the public ranking model, we show that the
greedy round-robin algorithm is strategyproof and achieves
2-approximation. This is also surprising as when the
items are goods, the best known approximation is O(n) by
Amanatidis et al. [2016]. When n ≤ 3, we give a strate-
gyproof divide-and-choose algorithm that further improves
this ratio to 32 . We complement these upper bound results
by a lower bound of 65 for any deterministic strategyproof al-
gorithms.
Our results as well as previous results for the case of goods
are summarized in Table 1.
1.2 Related Work
MMS fairness is weaker than the proportionality fairness con-
cept that requires that each agent gets at least 1/n of the total
utility she has for the set of all items [Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre,
2016]. However for indivisible items, there may not exist an
allocation that guarantees any approximation for the propor-
tionality requirement.
Most of the work on fair allocation of items is for
the case of goods although recently, fair allocation of
chores [Aziz et al., 2017] or combinations of goods and
chores [Aziz et al., 2018] has received attention as well.
Aziz et al. [2017] proved that MMS allocations do not al-
ways exist but can be 2-approximated by a simple algorithm.
Aziz et al. [2017] also presented a PTAS for relaxation of
MMS called optimal MMS. Barman and Murthy [2017] pre-
sented an improved approximation algorithm for MMS allo-
cation of chores.
Strategyproofness is a challenging property to satisfy for
fair division algorithms. Amanatidis et al. [2016] initiated the
work on strategyproof goods allocation with respect to MMS
fairness. In particular they proved the results covered in the
goods part of Table 1. There is also work on the approxima-
tion of welfare that can be achieved by strategyproof algo-
rithms for allocation of divisible items [Aziz et al., 2016].
2 Model and Preliminaries
For the fair allocation problem, N is a set of n agents, and
M is a set of m indivisible items. The goal of the problem
is to fairly distribute all the items to these agents. Differ-
ent agents may have different preferences for these items and
these preferences are generally captured by utility or valu-
ation functions: each agent i is associated with a function
vi : 2
M → R that valuates any set of items.
MMS fairness. Imagine that agent i gets the opportunity
to partition all the items into n bundles, but she is the last
to choose a bundle. Then her best strategy is to partition the
items such that the smallest value of a bundle is maximized.
LetΠ(M) denote the set of all possible n-partitionings ofM .
Then the maxmin share (MMS) of agent i is defined as
MMSi = max〈X1,...,Xn〉∈Π(M)
min
j∈N
vi(Xj). (1)
If agent i finally receives a bundle of items with value at least
MMSi, she is happy with the final allocation.
In this work, it is assumed that items are chores: vi({j}) ≤
0 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M . Then each agent actually wants
to receive as few items as possible. For ease of analysis, we
ascribe a disutility or cost function ci = −vi for each agent i.
In this paper, we assume that the cost function of each agent
i is additive. We represent each cost function ci by a vector
(ci1, · · · , cim) where cij = ci({j}) is the cost of agent i for
item j. Then for any S ⊆ M we have ci(S) =
∑
j∈S cij .
Agent i’s maxmin share can be equivalently defined as
MMSi = min〈X1,...,Xn〉∈Π(M)
max
j∈N
ci(Xj). (2)
Note that the maxmin threshold defined in Equation 2 is
positive which is the opposite number of the threshold defined
in Equation 1. Throughout the rest of our paper, we choose to
use the second definition. For each agent i, we use a permu-
tation overM , σi : M → [m], to denote agent i’s ranking on
the items: ciσi(1) ≥ · · · ≥ ciσi(m). In other words, item σi(1)
is the least preferred item and σi(m) is the most preferred.
Let x = (xi)i∈N be an allocation, where xi = (xij)j∈M
and xij ∈ {0, 1} indicates if agent i gets item j under al-
location x. A feasible allocation guarantees a partition of
M , i.e.,
∑
i∈N xij = 1 for any j ∈ M . We somewhat
abuse the definition and let Xi = {j ∈ M |xij = 1} and
ci(x) = ci(xi) = ci(Xi). An allocation x is called an MMS
allocation if ci(xi) ≤ MMSi for every agent i and α-MMS
allocation if ci(xi) ≤ αMMSi for all agents i.
We first state the following simple properties of MMS.
Lemma 2.1 implies if an agent receives k items, then its cost
is at most k ·MMSi.
Lemma 2.1 For any agent i and any cost function ci,
• MMSi ≥ 1nci(M);
• MMSi ≥ cij for any j ∈M .
Proof: The first inequality is clear as for any partition of the
items, the largest bundle has cost at least 1
n
ci(M).
For the second inequality, it suffices to show MMSi ≥
ciσi(1). This is also clear since in any partitioning of the
items, the largest bundle should have cost at least ciσi(1).
By Lemma 2.1, it is easy to see that if m ≤ n, any alloca-
tion that allocates at most one item to each agent is an MMS
allocation. Thus throughout this paper, we assumem > n.
Models. In the cardinal model, the agents are asked to ex-
press their cardinal costs over M . A deterministic cardinal
algorithm is denoted by a functionM : (Rm)n → Π(M). If
an algorithm is restricted to only use the resulting rankings of
the reported cardinal cost functions to allocate the items, we
called it an ordinal algorithm and the corresponding problem
is called the ordinal model. If the algorithm has the informa-
tion of all agents’ rankings by default, and every agent has
to report her cost function with respect to the known ranking,
the algorithm is called a public ranking algorithm and the
corresponding problem is called the public ranking model. A
deterministic algorithm M is called (α-approximate) MMS
if for any cost functions, it always outputs an (α-) MMS al-
location. A randomized algorithm M returns a distribution
overΠ(M) and is called α-approximate MMS if for any cost
functions c1, · · · , cn, Ex∼M(c1,··· ,cn)[maxi∈N ci(x)MMSi ] ≤ α.2
In this work, we study the situation when the costs are pri-
vate information of the agents. Each agent may withhold her
true cost function in order to minimize her own cost for the al-
location. We call an algorithm strategyproof (SP) if no agent
can unilaterally misreport her cost function to reduce her cost.
Formally, a deterministic algorithm M is called SP if for
every agent i, cost function ci and the cost functions c−i
of other agents, ci(M(ci, c−i)) ≥ ci(M(c′i, c−i)) holds
for all c′i. We call a randomized algorithm M SP in ex-
pectation if for every i, ci and c−i, Ex∼M(ci,c−i)ci(x) ≥
Ex∼M(c′
i
,c−i)ci(x) holds for all c
′
i.
2Note that if the α-approximation is defined as for every agent
i, Ex∼M(c1,··· ,cn)ci(x) ≤ αMMSi, the problem becomes trivial as
uniform-randomly allocating all items optimizes α to be 1.
Example 2.2 Suppose the cost function of an agent on four
items is c1 = (1, 2, 3, 4). In an SP cardinal algorithm, re-
porting c1 minimizes her cost (in expectation, for randomized
algorithm and the same for the following cases); In an SP or-
dinal algorithm, reporting c14 ≥ c13 ≥ c12 ≥ c11 minimizes
her cost; In an SP public ranking algorithm, the algorithm
knows c14 ≥ c13 ≥ c12 ≥ c11 by default, and the agent
minimizes her cost by reporting c1.
By the above definition, we have the following lemma im-
mediately, which also appeared in Amanatidis et al. [2016].
Lemma 2.3 An SP α-approximation algorithm for the ordi-
nal model is also SP α-approximate for the cardinal model.
An SP α-approximation algorithm for the cardinal model is
also SP α-approximate for the public ranking model.
We end this section by providing a necessary condition
of all SP algorithms for cardinal and public ranking models,
which is mainly used to prove our hardness results.
Definition 2.4 An allocation algorithmM ismonotone if for
any cost functions c1, · · · , cn and x = M(c1, · · · , cn), in-
creasing cij for some xij = 0, or decreasing cij for some
xij = 1 does not change xi.
First, by perturbing the costs by arbitrarily small different
values, we can assume without loss of generality that the cost
ci(S) of agent i is different for every S (M .
Lemma 2.5 All SP algorithms are monotone.
Proof: Fix any agent i and let x be the allocation when
i reports ci and the others report c−i. We fist consider the
case when xij = 0 and cij is increased. Let c
′ be the new
cost profile, and x′ be the new allocation. If x′ij = 1, then
if c′i(x
′
i) ≤ ci(xi), then agent i has incentive to lie when its
true cost is c (since ci(x
′
i) < c
′
i(x
′
i)); if c
′
i(x
′
i) > ci(xi), then
agent i has incentive to lie when its true cost is c′. Hence we
have x′ij = 0. For the same reason, we should have ci(x
′
i) =
ci(xi), which implies x
′
i = xi.
Next, we consider the case when xij = 1 and cij is de-
creased. If x′ij = 0, then if c
′
i(x
′
i) = ci(x
′
i) < ci(xi),
then agent i has incentive to lie when its true cost is c; if
c′i(x
′
i) = ci(x
′
i) ≥ ci(xi), then agent i has incentive to lie
when its true cost is c′ (since c′i(xi) < ci(xi)). Hence we
have x′ij = 1. We further have ci(x
′
i)− cij = ci(xi)− cij as
otherwise agent i has incentive to lie when its true cost is the
one that results in a higher cost. Hence we have x′i = xi.
3 Ordinal Model: Deterministic Algorithms
Before we present our algorithm for the ordinal model, we
first discuss the limitation of deterministic ordinal algorithms.
Lemma 3.1 No deterministic ordinal algorithm (even non-
SP) has an approximation ratio smaller than 43 , even for 2
agents and 4 items.
Proof: Consider the instance with 2 agents, whose ranking
on the m = 4 items are identical. Without loss of generality,
assume the item with maximum cost is given to the first agent,
i.e. x11 = 1. If the first agent is allocated only one item, then
for the case when c2 = (1, 1, 1, 1), the approximation ratio
is 32 : the second agent has total cost 3 while MMS2 = 2.
Otherwise for the case when c1 = (3, 1, 1, 1), the approxima-
tion ratio is at least 43 , as the first agent has total cost at least
3 + 1 = 4 while MMS1 = 3.
Next we present a deterministic sequential picking algo-
rithm that isO(log m
n
)-approximate and SP. Amanatidis et al.
[2016] gave a deterministic SP ordinal algorithm which is
O(m− n)-approximate when the items are goods. In the fol-
lowing, we show that if all the items are chores, it is possible
to improve the bound to O(log m
n
). Without loss of gener-
ality, we assume that n and m
n
are at least some sufficiently
large constant. As otherwise it is trivial to obtain an O(1)-
approximation by assigning m
n
arbitrary items to each agents.
Theorem 3.2 There exists a deterministic SP ordinal algo-
rithm with approximation ratio O(log m
n
).
SequPick. Fix a sequence of integers a1, . . . , an such that∑
i≤n ai = m. Order the agents arbitrarily. For i = n, n −
1, . . . , 1, let agent i pick ai items from the remaining items.
We note that as long as ai’s do not depend on the valuations
of agents, the rule discussed above is the serial dictatorship
rule for multi-unit demands. When it is agent i’s turn to pick
items, it is easy to see that her optimal strategy is to pick the
top-ai items with smallest cost, among the remaining items.
Hence immediately we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3 For any {ai}i≤n, SequPick is SP.
It remains to prove the approximation ratio.
Lemma 3.4 There exists a sequence {ai}i≤n such that the
approximation ratio of SequPick is O(log m
n
).
Proof: We first establish a lower bound on the approxima-
tion ratio in terms of {ai}i≤n. Then we show how to fix the
numbers appropriately to get a small ratio. Let r be the ap-
proximation ratio of the algorithm.
Consider the moment when agent i needs to pick ai items.
Recall that at this moment, there are
∑
j≤i aj items, and the
ai ones with smallest cost will be chosen by agent i. Let c be
the average cost of items agent i picks, i.e., ci(x) = c ·ai. On
the other hand, each of the
∑
j≤i−1 aj items left has cost at
least c. Thus we haveMMSi ≥ c ·
⌈
a1+...+ai−1
n
⌉
and
r = max
i∈N
{
ci(Xi)
MMSi
}
≤ max
i∈N

 ai⌈a1+...+ai−1
n
⌉

 .
It suffices to compute a sequence of a1, . . . , an that sum to
m and minimizes this ratio. Fix K = 2 log m
n
. Let
ai =
{
2, i ≤ n2 ,
min{m−∑j<i aj , ⌈K · (1 + Kn )i−n2−1⌉}, i > n2 .
Note that the first term of the min is to guarantee we leave
enough items for the remaining agents. Moreover, truncating
ai is only helpful for minimizing the approximation ratio and
thus we only need to consider the case when ai equals the
second term of themin. In the following, we show that
1. all items are picked:
∑
i∈N ai = m;
2. for every i > n2 : ai ≤ K ·
⌈
a1+...+ai−1
n
⌉
.
Note that for i ≤ n2 , since agent i receives 2 items, the
approximation ratio is trivially guaranteed.
The first statement holds because∑n
2
i=1 2 +
∑n
i=n
2
+1
(
K · (1 + K
n
)i−
n
2
−1)
=
∑
i≤n
2
(
K · (1 + K
n
)i−1
)
+ n
=(1 + K
n
)
n
2 · n− n+ n ≥ 2K2 · n2 > m,
and ai’s will be truncated when their sum exceedsm.
For i > n2 , observe that (let l = i− n2 − 1)
1
n
(a1 + . . .+ ai−1) = 1 + 1n
∑l
j=1K · (1 + Kn )j−1
= 1 + (1 + K
n
)l − 1 = (1 + K
n
)l.
Thus we have ai ≤
⌈
K · (1 + K
n
)l
⌉ ≤ K · ⌈(1 + K
n
)l
⌉ ≤
K ·
⌈
a1+...+ai−1
n
⌉
, as claimed.
We conclude the section by showing that our approxima-
tion ratio is asymptotically tight for SequPick.
Lemma 3.5 (Limits of SequPick) The SequPick algorithm
(with any {ai}i∈N ) has approximation ratio Ω(log mn ).
Proof: Fix K = 14 log
m
n
. Suppose there exists a sequence
of {ai}i∈N such that the algorithm is K-approximate.
Then the last agent to act must receive at most K items,
i.e., a1 ≤ K . Next we show by induction on i = 2, 3, . . . , n
that ai ≤ K(1 + 2Kn )i−1 for all i ∈ N .
Suppose the statement is true for a1, . . . , ai. Then if
ai+1 > K(1 +
2K
n
)i, we have
ai+1
a1 + . . .+ ai+1
>
K(1 + 2K
n
)i
k · n2K ((1 + 2Kn )i+1 − 1)
≥ K
n
.
Thus we have
∑n
i=1 ai ≤ n ·
(
(1 + 2K
n
)n − 1) ≤ n ·(
e2K − 1) < m, which is a contradiction, since not all items
are allocated.
4 Ordinal Model: Randomized Algorithms
We have shown a logarithmic approximation algorithm
SequPick for the problem. However, the algorithm may still
have poor performance when the number of items is much
larger than the number of agents, e.g., m = 2n. In this sec-
tion we present a randomized O(
√
logn)-approximation or-
dinal algorithm, which is SP in expectation.
Again, before we show our algorithm, let us first see a lim-
itation of the randomized ordinal algorithms.
Lemma 4.1 No randomized ordinal algorithm (even non-SP)
has approximation ratio smaller than 65 , even for 2 agents and
4 items.
Proof: Consider the instance with 2 agents, whose ranking
on them = 4 items are identical. Let p be the probability that
the algorithm assigns 2 items to both agents.
If p ≤ 35 , consider the instance with evaluation (1, 1, 1, 1),
for whichMMS1 = MMS2 = 2. Then with probability 1−p,
the agent receiving at least 3 items has cost at least 32 times
its maximin share, which implies that the expected approxi-
mation ratio is at least p+ (1 − p) · 32 = 32 − p2 ≥ 65 .
If p > 35 , then consider the instance with evaluation
(3, 1, 1, 1), for whichMMS1 = MMS2 = 3. Then with prob-
ability p, the agent receiving the item with cost 3 has cost at
least 43 times its maximin share, which implies an expected
approximation ratio at least p · 43 + (1− p) = 1 + p3 ≥ 65 .
Basically, if we randomly allocate all the items, one is
able to show that the algorithm achieves an approximation
of O(log n). The drawback of this naı¨ve randomized algo-
rithm is that it totally ignores the rankings of agents. In the
following, we show that if the agents have opportunities to
decline some “bad” items, the performance of this random-
ized algorithm improves to O(
√
logn). Note that since we
already have an O(log m
n
)-approximate deterministic algo-
rithm for the ordinal model, it suffices to consider the case
whenm ≥ n logn.
RandDecl. Let K = ⌊n√logn⌋. Based on the ordering of
items submitted by agents, for each agent i, label theK items
with largest cost as “large”, and the remaining to be “small”.
It can be also regarded as each agent reports a setMi of large
items with |Mi| = K . The algorithm operates in two phases.
• Phase 1: every item is allocated to a uniformly-at-
random chosen agent, independently. After all alloca-
tions, gather all the large items assigned to every agent
into setMb. Note thatMb is also a random set.
• Phase 2: Redistribute the items in Mb evenly to all
agents: every agent gets
|Mb|
n
random items.
Theorem 4.2 There exists a randomized SP ordinal algo-
rithm with approximation ratio O(
√
log n).
We prove Theorem 4.2 in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.3 In expectation, the approximation ratio of Algo-
rithm RandDecl is O(
√
logn).
Proof: We show that with probability at least 1 − 2
n
, ev-
ery agent i receives a collection of items of cost at most
O(
√
logn) · MMSi. Fix any agent i. Without loss of gen-
erality, we order the items according to agent i’s ranking, i.e.,
σi(j) = j for any j ∈M and ci1 ≥ · · · ≥ cim.
For ease of analysis, we rescale the costs such that
ci1 + ci2 + . . .+ cim = n
√
logn = K.
Note that after the scaling, agent i’s maximin share is
MMSi ≥
√
logn. Let xij denote the random variable in-
dicating that the contribution of item j to the cost of agent i.
Then for j > K , xij = cij with probability
1
n
, and xij = 0
otherwise. For j ≤ K , xij = 0 with probability 1. Note that
E[
∑m
i=1 xi] =
1
n
·∑mi=K+1 cij ≤ Kn = √logn.
Moreover, we have cij ≤ 1 for j > K , as otherwise
we have the contradiction that
∑K
j=1 cij > K . Note that
{xij}j≤m are independent random variables taking value in
[0, 1]. Hence by Chernoff bound we have
Pr[
∑m
j=1 xij ≥ 7
√
logn ·MMSi]
≤Pr[∑mj=1 xij ≥ 7 logn]
≤ exp
(
− 13 ·
(
7 log n
E[
∑
m
i=1
xi]
− 1
)
·E[∑mi=1 xi]) < 1n2 .
Then by union bound over the n agents, we conclude that
with probability at least 1− 1
n
, every agent i receives a bundle
of items of cost at most O(
√
logn) ·MMSi in phase 1.
Now we consider the items received by an agent in the
second phase. Recall that the items Mb will be reallo-
cated evenly. By the second argument of Lemma 2.1, to
show that every agent i receives a bundle of items of cost
O(
√
logn) · MMSi in the second phase, it suffices to prove
that |Mb| = O(n
√
logn) (with probability at least 1− 1
n
).
Let yj ∈ {0, 1} be the random variable indicating whether
item j is contained in Mb. For every item j, let bj = |{k :
j ∈Mk}| be the number of agents that label item j as “large”.
Then we have yj = 1 with probability
bj
n
. Since every agent
labels exactly n
√
logn items, we have
E[|Mb|] = E[
∑m
i=1 yi] =
1
n
∑m
i=1 bi = n
√
logn.
Applying Chernoff bound we have
Pr[
∑m
i=1 yi ≥ 2n
√
logn] ≤ exp
(
−n
√
logn
3
)
< 1
n
.
Thus, with probability at least 1− 2
n
, every agent i receives
a bundle of items with cost O(
√
logn · MMSi) in the two
phases combined. Since in the worse case, i receives a total
cost of at most n ·MMSi, in expectation, the approximation
ratio is (1− 2
n
) · O(√logn) + 2
n
· n = O(√logn).
Lemma 4.4 RandDecl is SP in expectation.
Proof: To prove that the algorithm is SP in expectation, it
suffices to show that for every agent, the expected cost it is as-
signed is minimized when being truthful. Let K = n
√
logn
and fix any agent i. Suppose ci1, . . . , ciK are the costs of
items labelled “large” by the agent; and ci,K+1, . . . , cim are
the remaining items. Then the expected cost assigned to the
agent in the first phase is given by 1
n
∑m
j=K+1 cij , as every
item is assigned to the agent with probability 1
n
. Now we
consider the cost the agent is assigned in the second phase.
Recall that the expected total cost of items to be reallocated
in the second phase is E[
∑
j∈Mb cij ] =
∑m
j=1 cij · bjn , where
bj is the number of agents that label item j “large”. Let E be
this expectation when agent i does not label any item “large”.
By labelling ci1, . . . , ciK “large”, agent i increases the
probability of each item j ≤ K being included in Mb by 1n .
Thus it contributes an 1
n
∑K
j=1 cij increase to the expectation
of total cost ofMb. In other words, we have
E[
∑
j∈Mb cij ] = E + 1n
∑K
j=1 cij .
Since a random subset of
|Mb|
n
items from Mb will be as-
signed to agent i, the expected total value of items assigned
to the agent in the two phases is given by
1
n
∑m
j=K+1 cij +
1
n
·
(
E + 1
n
∑K
j=1 cij
)
.
Obviously, the expression is minimized when ci1 + . . . +
ciK is maximized. Hence every agent minimizes its expected
cost by telling the true ranking over the items.
5 Cardinal Model
First, we present a lower bound on the approximation ratio
for the all deterministic SP cardinal algorithms.
Lemma 5.1 No deterministic cardinal SP algorithm has ap-
proximation ratio smaller than 43 , even for 2 agents and 4
items.
Proof: First, consider c1 = c2 = (3, 1, 1, 1), for which
MMS1 = MMS2 = 3. To obtain an approximation smaller
than 43 , the only possible allocation is to assign the first item
to some agent, and the remaining items to the other. Without
loss of generality, suppose agent 1 receives the first item.
By monotonicity of SP algorithms (Lemma 2.5), for the
case when c1 = (1, 3, 1, 1) and c2 = (3, 1, 1, 1). The assign-
ment remains unchanged. Now we consider the profile when
c1 = (1, 3, 1, 1) and c2 = (2, 2, 1, 1).
Note that we also have MMS1 = MMS2 = 3, and thus
(to guarantee the approximation ratio) agent 2 cannot receive
the last three items. Moreover, to guarantee SPness, agent 2
cannot receive a proper subset of the last three items, as oth-
erwise agent 2 will misreport (2, 2, 1, 1) when its true value
is (3, 1, 1, 1). Thus the first item must be assigned to agent 2,
and consequently the second item must be assigned to agent
1. To guarantee the approximation ratio, agent 1 should not
receive any other item, which means that agent 2must receive
the last two items, which violates the better-than- 43 approxi-
mation ratio.
For positive results, by Lemma 2.3, both algorithms in Sec-
tions 3 and 4 apply to the cardinal model. Thus we immedi-
ately have the following.
Corollary 5.1 For the cardinal model, there exists a deter-
ministic SP algorithm with approximation ratio O(log m
n
);
and a randomized SP-in-expectation algorithm with approxi-
mation ratio O(
√
log n).
6 Public Ranking Model
Amanatidis et al. [2016] provided a deterministic SP public
ranking algorithmwhich isO(n)-approximate if the items are
goods. In this section, we show that if the items are chores,
we can do much better.
6.1 Strategyproof Algorithms
We first give a simple SP algorithm with an approximation
ratio of at most 2.
RounRobi. Fix an arbitrary order of the agents, let the
agents pick items in the round-robin manner.
Theorem 6.1 For the public ranking model, RounRobi is SP
and has an approximation ratio of 2− 1
n
.
Proof: Aziz et al. [2017] proved that RounRobi gives an ap-
proximation bound of 2− 1
n
if at each round every agent is al-
located the item with smallest cost. Note that the algorithm is
ordinal hence no agent can change the outcome by misreport-
ing her cardinal utilities. Furthermore, since the preference
rankings of the agents are public knowledge, agents cannot
misreport by expressing a different ordinal preference. Hence
the algorithm is SP for the public ranking model.
By Theorem 6.1, when n = 2 and 3, the algorithm gives
a 32 and
5
3 approximations, respectively. Indeed, for n = 3,
we show a divide-and-choose algorithm which is SP and still
guarantees 32 -approximation ratio.
Theorem 6.2 For the public ranking model, there exist an SP
1.5-approximation algorithm when n = 3.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we order the items ac-
cording to agent 1’s ranking, i.e., σ1(j) = j for any j ∈ M
and c11 ≥ · · · ≥ c1m. The algorithm runs as follows:
• Let S1 = {1}, S2 = {j ∈ M |j mod 2 = 0} and
S3 = {j ∈ M |j > 1 and j mod 2 = 1}. Note that
(S1, S2, S3) is a partition of all the items.
• Let agent 2 select her favourite bundle from S1, S2, S3.
• Let agent 3 select her favourite one from the two bundles
left in Step 2, and assign the last bundle to agent 1.
It is easy to see that the above algorithm is SP as the algorithm
does not use any information reported by agent 1 and both of
agent 2 and agent 3’s best strategy is to report the costs such
that the bundle with smallest cost is selected. We are left to
prove the approximation ratio.
For agent 1, note that c1(S1 ∪ S3) ≥ c1(S2) ≥ c1(S3).
By the first argument of Lemma 2.1, c1(S3) ≤ c1(S2) ≤
1
2c1(M) ≤ 32 ·MMS1. By the second argument of Lemma 2.1,
c1(S1) ≤ MMS1. That is, no matter which bundle is left, the
cost of this bundle is at most 32 ·MMS1 to agent 1.
As agent 2 gets her best bundle, her cost is at mostMMS2.
For agent 3, since she is still able to select one from two
bundles, her cost for the better bundle is at most 12 · c3(M)
which is at most 32 ·MMS3 by Lemma 2.1.
In conclusion, the algorithm is a 32 -approximation.
6.2 Limitation of Strategyproof Algorithms
Next, we complement the upper bound results with a lower
bound result for the the public ranking model.
Lemma 6.3 For the public ranking model, no deterministic
SP algorithm has an approximation ratio smaller than 65 ,
even for 2 agents.
Proof: Let n = 2 and m = 6. Assume for contradic-
tion that there exists some SP algorithm with approxima-
tion ratio less than 65 . Suppose c1 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and
c2 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), then we have MMS1 = MMS2 = 3.
The algorithm must assign every agent exactly 3 items, as
otherwise the cost for one of them is 4 ≥ 65 · 3. Without loss
of generality, assume that A1 = {1, 2, 3} andA2 = {4, 5, 6}.
By Lemma 2.5, when c1 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5) and c2 =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), the assignments remain unchanged, i.e.,
A1 = {1, 2, 3}. If we further increase c26 to 5, we have
MMS1 = MMS2 = 5. If {6} ⊆ A2, we should have
A2 = {6} to guarantee an approximation ratio less than 65 .
Then we know that agent 2 has incentive to lie when its
true cost is c2 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1). Hence we have {6} ⊆
A1, which implies A1 = {6} and A2 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Again, by Lemma 2.5, for c1 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3) and c2 =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5), the assignment remains unchanged.
Applying a similar argument, for c1 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3) and
c2 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), we have A1 = {1, 2, 3}. Then for
c1 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3) and c2 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3), we have
{6} ⊆ A1, |A1| ≤ 2, and c2(A2) = 4 to guarantee an
approximation ratio less than 65 . Thus by Lemma 2.5, for
c1 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3) and c2 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5), the assign-
ment does not change, i.e., |A2| = 4, which contradicts the
conclusion we draw in the previous paragraph.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we initiated the study of SP and approximately
maxmin fair algorithms for chore allocation. Our study leads
to several new questions. The most obvious research ques-
tions would be to close the gap between the lower and up-
per approximation bounds for SP algorithms and to study the
lower bound of randomized SP cardinal algorithms.
At present we have two parallel lines of research for goods
and chores. It is interesting to consider similar questions for
combinations of goods and chores [Aziz et al., 2018]. An-
other direction is to study the SP fair allocation algorithms
for the case of asymmetric agents [Aziz et al., 2019].
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